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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 
Volume 16, Number 1 (March 2000) 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
EXPLORES THE FUTURE OF 
FAITH-BASED HEALTH CARE 
More than 100 persons from all 
parts of the United States, as well as 
Canada and Mexico, gathered at Lorna 
Linda University February 27-28,2000, 
to discuss "Faith-based Health Care in 
the 21 st Century: New Visions from 
Old Values." The purpose of the con-
ference was to explore ways religiously 
sponsored health-care facilities might 
respond to changing economic and 
administrative circumstances. 
Guest speakers made five of the 
eight presentations. Gary Gunderson, a 
Baptist minister who now serves at the 
Interfaith Health Project, Rollins 
School of Public Health, on the campus 
of Emory University, discussed mature 
faith and relevant science as two 
sources of accountability for faith-based 
healthcare. 
Susan Saladay made several dis-
tinctions and expressed some reserva-
tions in her answer to the question, 
"Should Christians use therapeutic 
touch?" She is director of the Center for 
1ioethics at William Jennings Bryan 
-institute in Lincoln, Nebraska. 
Daniel Sulmasy, a physician, moral 
philosopher, theologian, and Franciscan 
Friar, who now serves at Saint Vincents 
Hospital in New York City and at New 
York Medical College in Valhalla, took 
exception to the recommendation by 
some that Christians in general, and 
Roman Catholics in particular, should 
stop operating medical centers. 
Nancy Hoffman and Stephen B. 
King reported on the progress of 
Centura, a joint venture between 
Roman Catholic and Seventh-day 
Adventist facilities in Colorado, that is 
the largest provider of health care in that 
Rocky Mountain state. 
Margaret E . Mohrmann, a physician 
and theological medical ethicist who 
teaches at the University of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, reviewed the pertinent 
moral and ethical issues of healthcare 
reflected in the story of the Good 
Samaritan. 
Members of the LLU faculty made 
three of the presentations. Gerald 
Winslow, PhD, dean of the faculty of 
Religion, highlighted the significance 
and subtlety of changes in the way we 
speak and write about what many once 
called "the ministry of healing." 
Wil Alexander, PhD, founder and 
director of the Center for Spiritual Life 
and Wholeness explored the contribu-
tions of faith to culture, commitment, 
and communication. 
David R. Larson, OM in, PhD, pro-
fessor of religion and theological co-
director of the LLU Center for Christian 
Bioethics, suggested that in its discus-
sion of how the Christian related to oth-
ers in the 1st century, we might find 
hints as to how faith-based health care 
ought to relate to its secular counterparts 
in the 21 st century. 
Video ($17) or audio ($8.50) record-
ing of each presentation are available 
from AudioNideo Associates, P.O. Box 
51, Lorna Linda, California 92354. 
The conference was jointly 
presented by the Centers for Christian 
Bioethics and Spiritual Life & 
Wholeness. 
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Commentary 
Ruth Macklin Judges 
Bioethical Relativism 
by David R. Larson 
Ruth Macklin, an accomplished 
bioethicist at Albert Einstein College of 
Medicine in New York City, has 
weighed ethical relativism in the bal-
ances and found it wanting. Her book is 
titled Against Relativism: Cultural 
Diversity and the Search for Ethical 
Universals in Medicine. It was published 
by Oxford University Press in 1999. 
The first three of the ten chapters 
in Macklin's study are theoretical. She 
quickly endorses cultural relativism-
the indisputable , doctrine that human 
societies differ in their everyday beliefs 
and behaviors. Marshalling considera-
tions from both philosophy and anthro-
pology, she then challenges ethical or 
normative relativism, the view that the 
most basic ethical principles of diverse 
cultures can acceptably differ in irrecon-
cilable ways. She also questions cogni-
tive or epistemological relativism-the 
notion that human ways of knowing are 
so diverse that it is impossible for people 
from alien cultures to understand each 
other, let alone agree or disagree. 
The middle five chapters in Dr. 
Macklin's book are practical. She exam-
ines a number of medical circumstances 
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in which the issue of ethical or norma-
tive relativism emerges in urgent ways. 
With respect to each of these, Dr. 
Macklin pinpoints the problem of ethi-
cal relativism, delineates its logical 
inconsistencies and negative clinical or 
public policy consequences, and pro-
poses alternative ways of thinking and 
acting. These explorations are especial-
ly rich because of her first- hand experi-
ences as a bioethics consultant and 
researcher in Latin America, Africa, and 
Asia for grants from the Ford 
Foundation. 
The last two chapters of Dr. 
Macklin's book return to theoretical 
matters. She assesses the recent collab-
oration between those who foster 
human rights around the world and 
those who promote human health. She 
also proposes two standards by which to 
assess the ethical progress achieved by 
different cultures. One of these is the 
"principle of humaneness." It holds 
that cultures are ethically advanced to 
the degree that their customs, laws, and 
practices do not tolerate human pain 
and suffering. The other is the "princi-
ple of humanity." It contends that cul-
tures are ethically superior to the extent 
that their institutions respect the auton-
omy and equal worth of every person. 
Dr. Macklin's argument centers 
upon a distinction she develops 
throughout her entire book between 
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ethical universals, which she affirms, 
and ethical absolutes, which she denies. 
In her affirmation of ethical univer-
sals, she advances the view that ther .-..... 
are some basic ethical principles whic 
apply to all human beings. The familiar 
bioethical principles of respect for 
human autonomy, nonmaleficience, 
beneficience, and justice are examples 
of such fundamental norms, she holds. 
Ethical obligations such as these are 
universal, she contends, in the sense 
that it is never ethically appropriate 
simply to dismiss their directives as 
though they are not pertinent to some 
people or irrelevant in some circum-
stances. 
In her denial of ethical absolutes, 
which threads its way throughout her 
whole book, Dr. Macklin rejects several 
contentions she finds erroneous. One of 
these is that there is only one universal 
ethical principle from which all others 
are derived and to which all others are 
subordinate. A second is that in every 
circumstance, any particular ethical 
principle must always be given the 
same weight relative to other norms. A 
third is that there is only one acceptable 
way to implement the requirements ( 
an ethical principle. A fourth is thal. 
there can be no exceptions to what an 
ethical principle ordinarily requires. A 
fifth is that there is no difference 
between general ethical principles and 
more specific guidelines, a mistake that 
makes universal that which is actually 
parochial. 
Dr. Macklin therefore envisions a 
number of basic ethical principles, each 
of which creates universal-but pre-
sumptive rather than absolute-ethical 
obligations. It is the task of ethical 
analysis to relate these basic norms to 
each other and to the various challenges 
of human life in helpful ways, she 
holds. Her normative theory is clearly 
pluralistic in the numerical sense. It is 
also pluralistic in a lexical sense in that 
she does not arrange these ethical uni-
versals in some permanent hierarchy. 
Dr. Macklin concedes that her 
argument will jar some. What remains 
to be seen, however, is whether those 
who take exception to what she ha" 
written will respond with reasons ad 
evidence that are as persuasive and 
practical as hers. I'm not holding my 
breath. tI 
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Conditional Imortality and 
Cognitive Neuroscience 
by Nancey rvlurphy 
Presented at the JackW Provonsha Lectureship for the Loma Linda University School of Jledicil1e 
Alumlli Postgraduate Convention on iVarch 7, 2000 
It is an honor to be asked to give the annual Provonsha 
Lecture. I was particularly pleased to have received this invi-
tation when I learned that Dr. Provonsha himself has been 
interested in the topics I intend to address: mind and matter, 
freedom and determinism. In addition, Loma Linda 
University is an unusually congenial place to address these 
issues, as I'll explain later. 
Whenever I begin a lecture on this topic, I make my 
audience respond to a little survey. Which of the following 
comes closest to your view of human nature? 
1. Humans are composed of three parts: body, soul, 
and spirit (trichotomism). 
2. Humans are composed of two parts: body and soul, 
or body and mind (dualism). 
3. Humans are composed of one 'part': a physical body. 
(materialism/physicalism). 
4. The question doesn't make sense! 
The result I usually get, from a variety of kinds of audi-
ences is about 60 percent trichotomist, 35 percent dualist of 
one sort or the other, and often only one or two brave souls 
who will admit to being physicalists at that point. 
The results surprised me at first. But what was more sur-
rising was that I should have to do my own crude research 
to find out what people think on this issue. It's surely one of 
great importance, not just because of religious implications 
but simply because a society, it would seem, needs to have a 
shared idea about what a human being, most basically, is. 
Are we really immaterial beings who happen to inhabit 
our bodies temporarily, and could just as well do without 
them? Or are we essentially physical organisms, albeit organ-
isms that do philosophy, or practice medicine, that try to live 
morally, and perhaps pray, as well? 
Those of you who deal with the moral issues surround-
ing sickness and death are probably more acutely aware of 
the import of this topic than the general population. Is death 
the cessation of brain activity, or is that only a symptom of 
death, which is, essentially, the soul leaving the body? 
Yet this conflict regarding theories of human nature is 
seldom discussed in public forums. We can live and work 
with people for years and not know their position on this 
issue. Some of you may not even know what your spouse 
thinks-unbeknownst to you, you may be sleeping with a tri-
chotomist! 
Convergence Between Science and Theology 
I said I was surprised to find trichotomism the majority 
view in audiences I address. This surprised me because, 
vhereas Christianity and science are often thought to be reg-
j 
ularly at odds with one another, this is an area where biblical 
studies, philosophy, and science have all been converging in 
recent years, and they have been converging toward a physi-
calist account of human nature. 
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Biblical Studies and Theology 
It is well known that Christians, throughout most of their 
history, have assumed a dualistic view of the human person. 
In the first Christian centuries, and in the early Middle Ages, 
a modified form of Platonism dominated much of theology. 
In the high and late Middle Ages, Aristotle provided the basis 
for a less radical dualism. But when modern physics and cos-
mology displaced Aristotle's system, theWestern world, now 
much influenced by the philosopher Rene Descartes, turned 
again to a radical dualism of mind or soul (the terms were 
practically interchangeable then) and matter. 
What is not well known outside of seminaries and divin-
ity schools (and perhaps I should specify, seminaries more on 
the liberal end of the spectrum) is that biblical scholars and 
church historians, for a century now, have been questioning 
the long-held assumption that dualism is a biblical teaching. 
It is now widely accepted that the Hebrew Bible views 
humans holistically and, in fact, was not even interested in 
the more Hellenistic sort of question, "what are the essential 
parts or components of a human being?" 
The question of human nature is somewhat more con-
troversial when we examine the New Testament. There are 
a few brief passages that either directly or indirectly suggest 
dualism. I'm not a biblical scholar so I will not address these. l 
However, a safe conclusion is a negative one: it is not at all 
clear that the New Testament teaches body-soul dualism, 
and even less, trichotomism. The questions that the Bible 
means to address are different from ours today. So most of the 
biblical authors, if presented with my survey, would choose 
the fourth option, "the question doesn't make sense." 
Biblical scholars and historians of doctrine generally 
see body-soul dualism as a later development in 
Christian thought, after the New Testament was written 
and during the time Christian apologists were adapting 
the Christian message to the more Hellenized cultures of 
the Mediterranean world. The main reason this needs to 
be argued now is that biblical terms have for centuries 
been translated and overlaid with concepts from Greek 
philosophy. 
Now, I said at the beginning that Loma Linda University 
is a congenial place to discuss these issues. The reason is that 
this is a Seventh-day Adventist institution, and one of the 
distinctive features of Adventism has been its rejection of 
certain aspects of body-soul dualism. The title of my talk is 
"Conditional Immortality and Cognitive Neuroscience." Let 
me explain that first term. 
Christianity2 has had two very different concepts of life 
Nancey Murphy, PhD, ThO 
Professor of Christian Philosophy 
Fuller Theological Seminary 
Pasadena, California 
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after death. One is the view that at death the person comes 
apart; the body goes to the grave but the soul, being immor-
tal, goes to be with God. The other view is resurrection. We . 
say "resurrection of the body" but we ought rather to say 
"resurrection of the person" -the whole person. 
Resurrection is not mere resuscitation of a corpse, as Jesus 
did for Lazarus, but resurrection in the sense of a transforma-
tion or re-creation of the person in bodily form-glorified, 
and no longer subject to the limitations of the bodies we have 
now. These were competing views for the Jews in Jesus' day, 
along with the view that death is simply death and there is no 
afterlife. 
Most Christians today do not distinguish sharply 
between immortality of the soul and resurrection of the body 
because theologians in the early centuries created a hybrid 
account, according to which the body dies, the immortal soul 
goes off to God, and at the end of time the body is raised up 
and the two 'parts' are reunited. 
The doctrin~ of conditional immortality, held by 
Adventists and by some other Christians as well, is specifical-
ly the denial that human souls are naturally immortal.3 The 
motivation comes from the problem of what God is to do with 
those who are not saved. If all souls, once created, continue 
to exist forever, and if humans are free ultimately to reject 
God, then there must be some eternal destination for those 
who do reject God-hence the 'doctrine' of Hell. 
Conditional immortality asserts, in contrast, that life 
after death (resurrection) is a gift from God for those who 
choose it, and final extinction-a much more merciful alter-
native-is the lot of those who reject God. 
Notice that the doctrine of conditional immortality is not 
an outright rejection of dualism in favor of physicalism.4 
Nonetheless, holding this doctrine frees Adventists from 
other theological positions that make physicalism more diffi-
cult to accept. In addition, the traditional Adventist emphasis 
on physical well-being is a good antidote to the body-denying 
practices that have so often accompanied dualistic Christian 
teachings. 
Cognitive Neuroscience 
Now, the second half of my title is "cognitive neuro-
science." I stated earlier that there is a happy convergence 
among theology, philosophy, and science on the nature of the 
person. I'll say very little about philosophy, except to note 
that over the past generation physicalism has become the 
majority position among philosophers of mind, and that the 
intense interest this subject has received in the past decade 
or so is due almost entirely to the new light shed on it by 
rapid developments in cognitive science and the various 
branches of neuroscience. 
So let us consider what these sciences have to offer on 
the present topic. My thesis, in short, is this: All of the human 
capacities once attributed to the immaterial mind or soul are 
now yielding to the insights of neurobiology. Now, in order to 
defend this thesis, we have to have an overview of the rele-
vant capacities. One of the most elaborate and perceptive 
accounts of the functions of the soul was that of theologian 
and philosopher Thomas Aquinas, writing in the 13th centu-
ry. He followed Aristotle in recognizing three levels of func-
tioning: (1) that which we share with both animals and plants, 
4 
(2) that which we share with only the animals, and (3) that 
which is distinctive of humans. 
The faculties attributed to the lowest aspect of the soul-
nutrition, growth, and reproduction-have long fallen withi 
the sphere of biological explanation. 
A number of the faculties we share with animals have also 
been understood biologically for some time: locomotion and 
sense perception. In addition to the five external senses, 
Thomas Aquinas postulated four "interior senses." One of 
these is the phantasia or sensory imagination. It is now possi-
ble to study visual imagination using PET scans (positron 
emission tomography), which show the level of activity in var-
ious regions of the brain by recording the amount of blood 
flow. These scans show that during an exercise in visual imag-
ination the visual cortex is active, but not to the same extent 
as when the visual object is actually present. Another of 
Thomas Aquinas' interior senses was the sensus communis, the 
capacity to collate the inputs from the various external senses 
in order to associate them with the same object. This is now 
studied by neuroscientists as the "binding problem." The 
third of Thomas Aquinas' interior senses was the vis aestimati-
va, the ability to judge something as friendly or unfriendly, 
useful or useless. One instance of this faculty in humans is the 
ability to recognize others' emotions. While it has not been 
possible to determine the exact regions of the brain involved, 
some victims of strokes or tumors do lose this capacity. 
The fourth of Thomas Aquinas' interior senses is the vis 
memorativa, the ability to conserve memories of friend or foe, 
of what has given pleasure and what has caused injury. 
Neuroscientists now distinguish at least a dozen memory sy~( 
tems, and brain structures have been associated with many 0;-. 
them. 
The sort of memory Thomas Aquinas refers to here is an 
aspect of episodic memory, and it has been shown that such 
memories cannot be formed without the part of the brain 
called the hippocampus. We also share with animals the sen-
sitive appetite, that is, the ability to be attracted to the objects 
Save the Date 
February 11-12, 2001 
Fifth Annual Spiritual Life 
and Bioethics Conference 
"Care for the Caregiver: 
Who Really Cares?" 
E-mail us for further information: 
gsample@ethicscenter.llu.edu 
mhung@som.llu.edu 
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of sensation, such as food or mates. Neuroscience has made 
contributions here as well, for instance, in beginning to 
understand the role of neurotransmitters (the chemicals that 
conduct electrical impulses in the brain) in producing feelings 
f hunger or satiation. The emotions, according to Thomas 
Aquinas, are a product of both the vis aestimativa and the sen-
sory appetite. Emotions, too, are now known to be mediated 
by physical processes, with the involvement of neurotrans-
mitters. 
Among the rational faculties, distinctive of humans, 
Thomas Aquinas distinguishes the active and passive intel-
lects. The passive intellect is another sort of memory, closely 
resembling what current neuroscientists call declarative 
memory, and this has been found to be dependent on the 
medial temporal lobe of the brain. Active intellect is respon-
sible for abstracting concepts from 
among them the ability to anticipate the future and plan 
accordingly within a complex social environment; the sense 
of responsibility toward the self and others; and the ability to 
orchestrate one's survival deliberately, at the command of 
one's free will" (p. 10). In short, what Thomas Aquinas 
described as the "appetite for the good" appears to depend 
directly on localizable brain functions. 
A number of neuroscientists have begun to study the 
role of the brain in religious experience. For example, 
patients with temporal lobe epilepsy often develop strong 
interests in religion, and this has led to speculation that the 
temporal lobes are involved in certain sorts of normal reli-
gious experiences as well. 
What are we to make of all this? It is important to note 
that no such accumulation of data can ever amount to a proof 
that there is no nonmaterial 
sensory experience and for reason-
ing and judging . . These latter 
capacities are less well understood 
in neurobiological terms. 
However, they all involve the use 
of language, and language use and 
acquisition are an important area 
of current study. 
Biblical studies, philosophy, and 
neuroscience are all pointing in 
the same direction, toward a phys-
icalist account of the person. 
mind or soul in addition to the 
body. But if we recognize that 
the soul was originally intro-
duced into Western thought not 
from Hebraic Scripture but as 
an explanation for capacities 
that appeared not to be explain-
Two regions of the brain, Wernicke's area and Broca's 
area, have long been known to be involved in language. 
Language memory involves a variety of regions; selective 
damage due to strokes or tumors shows that access to com-
mon nouns, proper names, verbs, and even color terms 
' " epends on separate regions. Furthermore, syntactic and 
.' 'emantic capacities depend on different regions of the brain. 
The third of Thomas Aquinas' rational faculties is the 
will. This he defines as the capacity to be attracted to goods 
of a nonsensory sort. Along with intellect, this is the seat of 
moral capacities. Furthermore, since God is the ultimate 
good, the will also accounts for the capacity to be attracted to 
God. 
Neuroscience now contributes to our understanding of 
both morality and religious experience. Antonio Damasio has 
studied the neural processes that go into practical reasoning-
that is, the ability to make both moral and prudential judg-
ments. In his book, Descartes' Error, he reports the case of a 
19th century railway worker, Phineas Gage, whose brain was 
pierced by a metal rod. Gage recovered physically and his 
cognitive functions (attention, perception, memory, reasoning 
and language) were all intact. Yet he suffered a dramatic char-
acter change after the accident. The doctor who treated him 
noted that he had become "fitful, irreverent, indulging at 
times in the grossest profanity which was not previously his 
custom, manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impa-
tient of restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at 
times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating, 
devising many plans of future operation, which are no sooner 
arranged than they are abandoned."s 
Antonio Damasio's wife, Hanna, was able to determine 
rom the damage to Gage's skull exactly which parts of the 
brain would have been destroyed in the accident-selected 
areas of his prefrontal cortices. Antonio Damasio concludes 
from this and other similar cases that this area of the brain is 
"concerned specifically with unique human properties, 
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able in biological terms, then we 
can certainly say that for scientific purposes the hypothesis 
has been shown to be unnecessary. 
So biblical studies, philosophy, and neuroscience are all 
pointing in the same direction, toward a physicalist account of 
the person. Humans are not hybrids of matter and something 
else; they are simply physical organisms. 
It would be easy at this point to fall into the reduction-
ist's error of claiming that "morality" or "religious experi-
ence" is nothing but a brain process. But the correct account 
of physicalism is to say that it is our complex physical organi-
zation and our social relations that enable our morality and 
our religious awareness. 
Problems for the Physicalist 
But is physicalism, however well attested by these vari-
ous intellectual authorities, entirely without problems? This 
is certainly not the case. In this last section of my lecture I 
will briefly address some of the problems occasioned by a 
shift from dualism to physicalism. 
At the beginning of my lecture, I alluded to the role that 
the concept of soul has played in moral arguments through-
out Western history, especially in arguments regarding abor-
tion and care for the dying and disabled. So medical ethicists 
need to ask, just as Christian theologians have had to ask, did 
we ever really need that concept? That is, rather than basing 
arguments on the existence and value of an immortal soul, 
could we not instead have couched our arguments for the 
protection of human life in terms of Jesus' command to care 
especially for the "least of the brethren"? Or, for a more sec-
ular time, in terms of concern for the protection of human 
life, period? 
Much more needs to be said on these issues but I am a 
philosopher, not an ethicist, and so I turn to a problem from 
within my own discipline-although one not unrelated to 
ethics-the problem of free will. 
One of the motivations for dualism in the modern period 
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has, in fact, been the problem of free will. If everything mate-
rial is governed by the laws of physics, then how can a human 
act freely? The simple solution appeared to be dualism. The 
body is subject to the laws of nature but the soul or mind is 
free. This was only an apparent solution, though, because no 
explanation has ever been given of how this nonmaterial 
entity could have any causal impact on the physical body. 
Physicalism, of course, solves the problem of mind-body 
interaction-mental functions are brain functions and it is a 
mere scientific problem to explain how the brain interacts 
with the rest of the body, not an impossible philosophical 
dilemma. But the physicalist does have to go back to the 
drawing board to argue for free will. 
Now, some physicalists are willing to give up free will. 
There is a long philosophical tradition arguing that we can 
still make sense of notions of moral responsibility without 
free will. But I think it is essential, not only for moral reasons, 
not only for theological reasons, but simply to make sense of 
rational discourse. If all human thoughts are simply deter-
mined by the laws of neurobiology, then there is no room for 
reasons in human life. And, in fact, the determinist's own 
argument does not look very convincing if he can convince us 
that one believes it only because her neurons made her do it 
and not because it is actually true! 
Now, I'd like to look at my watch at this point, and tell 
you that I have actually solved the problem of free will and it's 
just that I don't have time to explain it all to you this evening. 
Sorry, my problem is not just the clock. I do not have a neat 
solution. However, I do think that a number of resources are 
available for addressing the problem, and these come not 
from philosophy but from developments in cognitive science. 
This suggests that while the 
What is human free will beyond this animalian open 
behavior? Part of what is involved is the ability to pursue 
higher-order goals by detaching our behavior from immediate 
stimuli. Terrence Deacon describes an instructive experi-
ment. A chimp is given the opportunity to choose betwee 
two unequal piles of candy. It always chooses the bigger one. 
But then the situation is made more complicated: the chimp 
chooses, but then the experimenter gives the chosen pile to a 
second chimp and the first ends up with the smaller one. 
Children over the age of two catch on quickly and choose the 
smaller pile. But chimps have a very hard time catching on; 
they watch in agitated dismay, over and over, when the larger 
pile of candy is given away. 
Terrence Deacon says that the task poses a difficulty 
for the chimps because the presence of such a salient 
reward undermines their ability to stand back from the sit-
uation and subjugate their desire to the pragmatic context, 
which requires them to do the opposite of what they would 
normally do to achieve the same end (p. 414). 
Now the experiment is further complicated. The 
chimps are taught to associate numbers with the piles of 
candy. When given the chance to select numbers rather 
than the piles themselves, they quickly learn to choose the 
number associated with the smaller pile. Deacon argues 
that the symbolic representation helps reduce the power of 
the stimulus to drive behavior. Thus, he argues that 
increasing ability to create symbols progressively frees 
responses from stimulus-driven immediacy. So language is 
one piece of the solution to the free-will problem. It helps 
to account for our ability to detach our behavior from bie 
logical drives. 
A second piece of the puz-
problem of free will may in fact 
have been insoluble for earlier 
generations of philosophers, this 
was due simply to lack of knowl-
edge about cognitive processes 
and not to an inherent difficulty 
in reconciling a law-governed 
natural order with human free-
"I'd like to tell you that I have 
actually solved the problem of 
free will. I do not have a neat 
zle is also illustrated in the 
experiment with the chimps. 
What the chimps in the first 
phase of the experiment are not 
able to do is to make their own 
behavior the object of their 
solution. " 
dom. Let us see how far we can get. 
The main worry that physicalism presents regarding free 
will is this: If mental events are really brain events, then aren't 
all our thoughts and decisions determined by the laws of neu-
robiology? Some philosophers try to evade determinism by 
turning to quantum indeterminacy and trying to find a role for 
it in decision-making processes. I suggest, instead, that we 
consider two features of human cognitive processes: The first 
is our capacity for language; the second is what I shall call self-
transcendence-the hierarchical organization of cognitive 
processes that makes it possible for us to attend to our own 
cognitive processes. 
I'm following Terrence Deacon in his reflections on the 
difference language makes in freeing human behavior from 
biological drives. (See his book The Symbolic Species. 6 ) Animals 
(higher animals, at least) have what are called "open 
instincts." That is, they have innate goals such as food and 
mates. The goals themselves are predetermined by biology, 
but how to satisfy them is not. Thus, a donkey can choose 
which tuft of grass to eat, but it can't choose to go on a diet. 
6 
attention. To do such a thing is 
what I mean by self-transcen-
dence. That is, I have a goal-to get the most candy. I 
choose the big pile and it gets taken away time after time. 
But instead of focusing only on what the experimenter 
does, I turn my attention to my own behavior, my own cog-
nitive strategy, and judge it to be faulty. This second-order 
reflection and evaluation quickly leads to an altered strate-
gy that works. 
There is no intrinsic limit to these layers of cognition. 
The next step in self-transcendence might be to notice the 
fact that I have just successfully adapted my strategy. But 
then I might observe what a smug and greedy creature I 
have become and ask myself why I wanted all that candy in 
the first place. And so on. 
Notice a peculiar feature of how we use first-person 
pronouns. When I'm focused on the candy it is "I" wh(' 
wants it. When the strategy for getting it comes undd 
scrutiny, then I am the one scrutinizing and the candy-
seeker becomes "me" -the object of my scrutiny. And 
when I congratulate myself for successful solution to the 
Continued on page 8 
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Question: Is it ethically permissible to 
honor a refusal of transfusion by a pregnant 
woman if this places her fetus at increased 
riskP 
A 24-year-old woman with two chil-
dren was admitted two days before this 
consultation at 29 weeks gestation 
because of short-lived, painless, brisk 
vaginal bleeding. An ultrasound con-
firmed the gestational age (estimated 
weight 1630 grams) and showed a central 
placenta previa. She is currently having 
minimal spotting and her hemoglobin is 
10.7. She has been a Jehovah's Witness 
since age 12 and insists that she not be 
given any blood products. She under-
stands that this choice might lead to her 
death, and she accepts this risk. 
The clinical ethics consultant met 
with the obstetrical and neonatal teams 
at a perinatal conference. The majority 
of the obstetricians demonstrate a high 
regard for maternal autonomy and would 
e averse to seeking a court order to 
transfuse this woman. It is their consid-
ered opinion that, should she resume 
heavy bleeding which endangers either 
her or the baby, there would be time to 
do an emergency Caesarean section 
(CIS) allowing salvage of the baby in 
good condition. This might involve a 
decision to operate earlier than they 
might in a non-Jehovah's Witness patient 
(i.e. they might wait longer with another 
patient to see if her bleeding would slow, 
hoping to give the baby more intrauter-
ine time), and this might result in addi-
tional prematurity for the baby. There 
was a minority opinion expressed that an 
emergency court order should be sought, 
or even consideration of emergency 
transfusion without a court order, to pro-
tect this woman's life and health. 
The neonatologists present at the 
conference believe that if this baby were 
delivered now, he would have a 90 per-
cent chance for survival, and standard 
practice would be to obtain a court order 
'i> transfuse if medically indicated. They 
~dlso respect parental discretion and 
would use different standards in deter-
mining need for transfusion for this baby 
than they would for the child of non-
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Jehovah's Witness parents. The neona-
tologists present also expressed an oblig-
ation to protect this currently healthy 
child from reckless exposure to risk, and 
one encouraged court-ordered transfu-
sion of the mother if the baby's life were 
endangered by her hemorrhage. 
The ethics consultant met with 
both parents who are united and firm in 
their request. If there is significant 
chance that a transfusion might be 
imposed over their objection, they 
request transfer to another hospital 
where the professional staff would fully 
agree to honor their beliefs, even if this 
would put her at slightly increased risk 
of death should she hemorrhage during 
transfer. 
Discussion 
Jehovah's Witness patients general-
ly desire the best possible medical care 
for themselves and their children short 
of the receipt of blood products which 
they consider an abomination to Jehovah 
with eternal consequences to them. 
They are thus exercising a negative right 
of refusal of therapy, but at the same 
time demanding a positive right to alter-
native medical care. When only their 
own life and health are at stake, the 
medical profession should honor such 
requests. 
When a second party is also endan-
gered (such as a fetus), the problem is 
more complex. If the alternative 
demanded is a reasonable medical 
option it is generally felt to be justified 
to follow that demand, even if it entails 
some increased risk to the second party. 
If the alternative demanded is not a rea-
sonable medical option, and by follow-
ing it the second party would be 
doomed, it may be justified to over-ride 
the refusal. 
Recommendations 
1: Emergency CIS at the first sign of 
dangerous bleeding in this patient 
would appear to be a reasonable medical 
alternative and the increased risk of pre-
maturity for the baby would appear to be 
acceptable. 
2: Since the gestation is sufficient 
that the risk of premature birth would 
not preclude an emergency CIS, and 
because the CIS could likely be per-
formed more quickly than could initia-
tion of a transfusion, it seems unneces-
sary to be concerned about overriding 
the patient's refusal of transfusion in 
order to protect the baby. 
3: The proposed neonatal manage-
ment of this child is standard practice. 
4: There needs to be thorough dis-
cussion of the issue of intra-operative 
transfusion of this patient should her life 
be in danger, including discussion of 
alternative therapies which might pre-
serve her life and health (including avail-
ability of the Cell-Saver, etc.). Such dis-
cussions should include the patient, the 
obstetrical attending physicians and 
house staff, the department of anesthesi-
ology, and possibly the hospital attorney. 
No one on the care team should be 
forced into a situation in which he or she 
feels morally or professionally compro-
mised. At the same time, if there is sig-
nificant likelihood that the patient might 
be transfused against her wishes, she 
should be so informed so that she can 
consider continuing her care elsewhere. 
Follow-up 
Three weeks after the ethics con-
sultation, the patient's vaginal bleeding 
resumed. Though it was fairly light, 
when it persisted for two hours, an emer-
gency Caesarean section was done with 
an estimated blood loss of 1000 cc. The 
mother did well and the baby boy was 
taken to the Neonatal ICU where he 
thrived without the need for blood trans-
fusion. 0 
*This case consultation report is 
based on an actual situation presented to 
the Clinical Ethics Consultation Service 
at LLUMC. Some clinical and social 
details have been changed to ensure 
confidentiality, but the changes do not 
affect the su bstance of the ethics discus-
SIon. 
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problem, I am the congratulator. 
So the ability for self-transcendence allows us to take 
account of feedback from the environment and to adjust our 
behavior accordingly in order to reach our goals. More impor-
tant, this sort of self-observation allows us to call into question 
the goals themselves. And, finally, the ability to generate inter-
nal models of ourselves engaged in various activities allows us 
to calculate the likely outcome of various actions and to assign 
an evaluation of good or bad to each scenario. This assignment 
of value then affects the probability that the behavior will be 
acted out in the future. 
N ow, whether these cognitive capacities-language, self-
transcendence, running behavioral scenarios in imagination, 
and re-evaluation of goals-amounts to having free will 
depends in part on what is meant by "free will." Philosophers, 
of course, have been arguing over this for centuries. One point 
of disagreement is over the distinction between "liberty of 
spontaneity" and ' "liberty of indifference." Liberty of spon-
taneity requires only that one be free to do what one chooses, 
regardless of whether one's desires were determined. Free will 
in the sense of indifference requires that the agent could have 
done otherwise. This requires, in turn, that the agent's choice 
or desire or goal was not determined by something else. 
The account I've sketched here establishes free will in the 
first sense, if we recognize that the "I" is identified with the 
highest-level evaluator. However, a likely objection to this 
claim would be to point out that this highest-level evaluation 
isn't itself uncaused. So something is determining its choices, 
and therefore the person is not really free. This is the objection 
from the proponent of liberty of indifference, who says that the 
only real freedom is totally uncaused action. 
Now, I can't make a full-scale argument here, but I do want 
to suggest that this account of freedom-that is, as totally 
uncaused-is implausible. The alternatives to freedom of this 
sort are biological determinism, or social determinism, or a com-
bination of the two. But would we want to be completely free of 
either? That is, our biology has evolved to ensure our survival; 
social structures have been designed, by and large, for human 
good. So the goal of being completely free from both biology 
and social environment is not to be desired. 
I suggest that it is better to think of free will not as 
all-or-nothing, but as a matter of degree. What is wanted is the 
ability to arbitrate among potential biological and social deter-
minants. And this is exactly what the self-transcendence I have 
been talking about allows us to do-that is, the ability to eval-
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uate the factors driving my behavior, to envision alternatives, 
and to reset goals in light of the abstract ideals that symbolic 
language makes possible. To borrow a phrase from Daniel 
Dennett, this seems to be the only kind of free will "worth 
wanting." 
Conclusion 
It's time to conclude. Scholars in fields as unrelated as 
biblical criticism and neuroscience are conspiring to under-
mine one of the staples of Western intellectual history-
body-soul dualism. I suppose I'm a sort of evangelical physi-
calist, but my purpose this evening was not so much to con-
vert you to my point of view (well, not so much), but rather to 
get out in the open these conflicting views of human nature, 
to provoke you to think about the implications of the shift 
from dualism to physicalism for your own line of work-and, 
of course, for your own life. 
What is the good life for humans? The answer depends 
on whether humans are quasi-angelic beings, just passing 
through this physical world. Or are we, in the terms of the 
book of Genesis, children of Adam, made from "adamah" 
(earth)? We can recapture the pun in the original Hebrew by 
describing ourselves as humans, made from humus. 0 
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